Condorcet and IRV are almost identical twins, using identical ballots, looking at lower choices whenever they choose to, and usually agreeing as to winner:
Condorcet always looks at lower choices, being influenced whenever they matter.
IRV looks at lower choices only when it realizes it cannot make a decision based only on upper choices.
Let us try a sample election: District is agreed on everything, including that Donald should be required to dye his hair, but half favoring Pink and half favoring Green for dye. Identical triplets run for office, one campaigning Pink and two Green - and each getting identical public campaign funds:
Plurality: 1/2 vote P; 1/4 vote G1; 1/4 vote G2. It was the mix of candidates, electorate, and method that guaranteed the P win - none qualified for the label "weak". If even 34% of the voters vote P, P wins for G1 and G2 would have to share 66% - among the reasons for ditching Plurality.
Approval: Here votes go to P, or to G1 and G2, a near 3-way tie - reflecting voter sentiment.
IRV: Similar votes and two steps: G1 vs G2 and winner picks up loser's second choice votes, setting up a near tie with P.
Condorcet: Similar votes and near 3-way tie recognized in one step, for complete ballots are always counted.
While voters make odd choices for many reasons, probably including pity, they can as well do this for first choice as for lower - in the three above methods that offer room for both odd and serious choices, going odd for first choice does no harm unless MANY voters vote the same odd choice.
Like IRV, separate runoffs have been around a long time. Separate runoffs almost frustrated French voters into riots this year and, given a similar set of candidates and voters, IRV could easily have stumbled into the same result.
Dave Ketchum
On Sat, 14 Dec 2002 04:58:03 -0500 Donald E Davison wrote:
--12/12/02 - Giving `crutches to weak candidates': Greetings Alex and EM list members,Alex, you wrote: "Healthy competition does NOT include giving crutches to weak candidates..." This is something we agree on, but if you truly believe this, then why are you supporting Condorcet and/or Approval Voting? For, this is what these two method do, they give `crutches to weak candidates'. Alex: "...but it does include removing incentives for a candidate to avoid votes, e.g. non-monotonicity." Donald: Non-monotonicity is a bad joke, it does not exist, it has never happened in a real election, it only happens in extreme examples concocted by the Charlatans. Irving has been in use for over eighty years in real election in the real world and not once has there been an election in which one of the Charlatans' extreme examples occured. Can you say the same for Approval Voting? The ball's in the court of the Charlatans to prove that non-monotonicity has ever influenced an Irving election, they have eighty years of Irving experience to draw from. A few months ago I posted some real ballots to this list and requested anyone to use the ballots and prove that Irving or STV can be non-monotonicity in the real world. No one responded. The Great Thinker, Tom Ruen, wrote: "I support IRV over Approval because it best protects voters from themselves." Most voters do not need to make lower choices. In an Irving election, this will not matter because only one choice at a time will be charged with a vote, but in Condorcet and Approval elections, these lower choices will be `pity votes'. The voters need to learn not to make `pity votes'. It is best to use an election method in which `pity votes' will have little effect. Any success that weak candidates may hope to have over strong candidates will depend on `pity votes' received by the weak candidates. The Charlatans know that if voters are given more votes then some voters will foolishly make the mistake of handing out `pity votes' and maybe these `pity votes' will make the difference in winning an election for the Charlatans' weak candidate. It is proper for a jurisdiction to select a method that will protect votes from themselves, from their own `pity votes'. That method is Irving. Pity votes will have little influence in an Irving election, but the bad effects of `pity votes' can easily happen in the two methods, Condorcet and Approval. Anyone is a fraud who tries to promote these two dubious methods because they are attempting to trick the voters into making valuable `pity votes' - valuable to the supporters of the weak candidates. Fraud is the word that defines a Charlatan. So, if you don't wish to be called a Charlatan, then don't be one. Regards, Donald Davison, host of New Democracy at http://www.mich.com/~donald
[EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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