It seems reasonable that if S is a ballot set with a definite winner X, and T is any other ballot set, then sufficiently many copies of S added to T should result in a ballot set supporting X.
As far as I can tell, all seriously considered deterministic methods (including IRV and Borda) satisfy this condition. What should we call it? Here are some ideas: The Minority Swamping Criterion The Asymptotic Monotonicity Criterion The Asymptotic Robustness Criterion The Irrelevance of Negligible Minorities Criterion For those who have had a little topology, this condition can be interpreted as openness of the victory regions in the space of all possible elections associated with the method. Why is this condition interesting? I believe that this condition and the Pareto condition taken together might be sufficient to rule out the Strong FBC. To be continued ... Forest ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
