---------- Original Message ----------------------------------
From: Adam Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 09 Feb 2003 02:59:35 -0500
Adam wrote:
Moreover, anyone can use a winning votes-based program to serve as a margins-based
count, simply by splitting every voter with an unexpressed preference into two half
voters, each of whom express one of the two possible preferences. This eliminates all
equal rankings or truncation, so that every ballot is fully expressed. After this
change, you will have the same result from margins or winning votes at this point.
This result will
not necessarily match the winning votes-based result of the original votes, but it
would match the margins-based result from those votes.
My comment:
You seem to be incorrectly assuming that the margins method has non-voted options
ranked last like your preferred winning votes method. The margins method could place
the non-voted options at the approval cutoff. There is no way to convert from your
preferred winning votes method to all variants of margins.
Adam wrote:
Since no equivalent procedures exist to make a margins program emulate winning votes,
it strikes me as more egalitarian to write a winning-votes based program. This way
the user can decide (through very simple manipulation of their input) whether they
want margins or winning votes, even if there's no check box. Of course, since I like
winning votes more
than margins, I wouldn't bother with this manipulation.
My comments:
In my opinion, it is relatively easy to code a Condorcet method program to give the
user the choice of measure of defeat. So the only reason not to do so is to use the
program as a means for trying to enforce your preference on other people. The program
should be open source and in the same spirit the program shouldn't take sides on
technical disputes where knowledgeable people can and do disagree as you and Mike when
you cite other knowledgeable people who appear to prefer margins. Furthermore, it
seems to me that the choice of method (and variations of a method) is logically
related to the context. By context, I mean variables such as the number of
candidates, how well the voters know the candidates, how many candidates are to be
elected, how often the candidates are elected, what authority the elected candidates
acquire, how much the voters will know in advance about the probable outcome, how much
opportunity the voters have to engage in individual and colloborative st
rategic voting and the like.
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