Venzke, I invite you to read: http://www.fairvotecanada.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?topic=8&forum=1&4
It is a STV variant defined on a national instead of regional basis, and that uses a mix of alternative vote and residual approbation to produce an exactly proportional result instead of vote transfers and quotas. Some other aspect ensures that at worst, the governement will be a two-parties coalition. Read and feel free to comment. (English version is the fourth post...) Steph Venzke Kevin a �crit : > Hello. I've been reading lots of messages on this > list for a week or so, and I decided it would be good > to join it. I can ask questions even if my own ideas > are not generally interesting. > > I've always been interested in organization of > government (esp. comparative), but I've only recently > become interested in single-member election methods. > Up to that point, I most admired a system like > Chile's: open-list PR for two seats per district. (I > valued balance.) But I've become disenchanted with > party lists and proportional representation generally. > I think parties would wield too much power, and there > would be little reason to expect that passed > legislation would be "improved" somehow with PR. (In > other words, even if you reduce wasted votes cast by > voters, among legislators the number of wasted votes > should end up about the same.) > > I'm now more taken with Approval and Condorcet after > reading about them. I want the elected candidate to > have the broadest base of support identifiable. I > have an issue or two with both systems, though. > Because of voter strategy, I worry that Approval would > do little to "centralize" the elected candidates. > With Condorcet I worry that many voters would rank > candidates into three groups: the favored candidates > highest, the poorly understood candidates second (we > have such candidates even under plurality; wouldn't > their number increase quite a bit under Condorcet?), > and finally, the disliked candidates. I worry that, > as a consequence, an "unknown" candidate could > accidentally win, particularly if many voters lazily > place unknown candidates in the same positions. > > I'm also interested to read about exotic systems. > (I've seen some of interest here which defy my > comprehension, as I don't understand concepts such as > "eigenvectors.") I've devised some bad ones myself. > One of my favorites puts the incumbent on a party list > all by himself, and every challenger is "de facto" on > a second, "challenger" list. The voter votes for only > one candidate. The result is that the incumbent only > wins with an outright majority; if the incumbent fails > to get a majority, the "challenger" candidate with the > most votes is the winner. It would be an entertaining > system if nothing else. (You could complicate it > further by permitting any candidate to run instead on > the "incumbent list," with the qualification that such > a candidate would need an outright majority within the > list's votes to take it from the incumbent. You could > use the option to avoid splitting your party's votes.) > > I am putting finishing touches on a system which is an > Approval variant aiming to select the Condorcet Winner > more often. I hope to write a document on it. First > I have to make sure I can defend the system's results > philosophically, but I'm very close to that point. I > also want to write a quick program or two to see if > idiotic results ever occur in random scenarios (that > is, compared with Approval's results). I hope it will > be interesting. > > Stepjak > > ___________________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! > Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com > > ---- > For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), > please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
