--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: > On Tue, 25 Feb 2003 09:23:41 +0100 (CET) Venzke > Kevin wrote: > > > I wonder if the only reason IRV has more apparent > > backing than approval or Condorcet is because it > would > > permit our present politicians to be elected even > more > > The above makes no sense, for IRV and Condorcet use > identical ballots and, > most of the time, award identical winners.
They are only likely to award identical winners when the voters and candidates think the rules are IRV when they're voting and entering the race, respectively. This is because more than two candidates may be viable under Condorcet rules. Under IRV, usually only two candidates can really win, and the voters know it and vote that way; the "compromise candidates" know it, too, and don't enter the race. > That is: > Both get rid of Plurality's spoiler problem, IRV only reliably does this when the voters acknowledge that they have to give favor to one of the two lesser evils. But how different is that from Plurality? > which should be > attractive to politicians. Condorcet eliminates the spoiler problem by permitting voters to vote (more) sincerely, and (thus) by making more candidates viable. Why on earth would that be attractive to our present politicians? > Both thus encourage voting for third party > compromise candidates, > which could make successful politicians nervous. At the risk of being repetitive: They don't have to be too nervous with IRV. If a third party candidate becomes a spoiler, the winner will still be a "lesser evil." But they *would* have to be very nervous under Condorcet rules, because they could lose. If you put voting systems in order of to what degree they preserve the problem of the election of the lesser of two evils, I would draw it like this: IRV - Plurality - Approval - Condorcet. My conclusion is that people who support IRV, while understanding the objections to it, must have a different motivation. I suspect consequently that support for IRV can't be easily converted to support for a different system. Stepjak ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
