I suppose you meant: Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner.
Steph Markus Schulze a �crit : > Dear Steph, > > the participation criterion says that it is not possible > to worsen the outcome by participating: > > Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that > a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers > candidate B to candidate A, is added to the original > profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner. > > Moulin demonstrated that the Condorcet criterion and the > participation criterion are incompatible. (Herve Moulin, > "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox," > Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, pp. 53-64, 1988.) > > Markus Schulze > > ---- > For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), > please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
