On Oct 14, 2005, at 8:38 AM, Warren Smith wrote: > I edited the http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ > Instant_Runoff_Normalized_Ratings > page
The edit added some mathy stuff about normalization, and this: > If it were not for the "runoff," then generally the best strategy > in IRNR[p] is simply to (strategically) plurality-vote, i.e. giving > all candidates except one a rating of zero. This is true whenever > there are two "frontrunner" candidates judged to be far more likely > to win than the others and p is finite (then vote for the best > among these two), and its truth is unaffected by the runoff by > induction on rounds. > > If p is infinite, IRNR without the runoff would just become > equivalent to range voting in the range [-1, 1] with an extra rule > demanding that the best- or worst-rated candidate must have a > rating with absolute value 1. The best strategy is then the same as > for approval voting and again this statement's validity is > unaffected by adding the runoff. I'm kinda confused about this commentary. I think it doesn't directly pertain to IRNR, but rather IRNR if you break it. I'll accept for now that all-on-one is the correct strategy for a normalized ratings vote. I think I demonstrated that to myself once. But still, why comment on IRNR without the IR on this page? Is the L-infinity normal interesting or useful? Divide the ratings by the infinity-root of the sum of the ratings raised to the infinity? It's been too long since I studied such things and I can't tell what that operation would practically _do_ to some data. I think practically L1 and L2 are all we need. So, your commentary may be correct, but, um, so what? Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
