On Nov 12, 2006, at 23:44 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: > Juho wrote: >> Some more proposals: >> >> 1) In E the average value was used to make the division to max and >> min. Also 50% of the candidates getting max and 50% min could be one >> strategy. > > I guess that's what Forest meant with "above median utility approval".
Yes, seems so. (I just replied without reading all the relevant mails.) > Another question: Don't these results show that from the strategical > point of view Range Voting is actually only Approval Voting with some > added possibilities that only naive voters will use in the first > place? Yes, Range voting easily becomes just Approval Voting. Simulations where all voters have same strategy don't show this very strongly yet but I'd expect simulations that have voters with different strategies would show more clearly that it pays off to be more strategic / "approval oriented" than voters in average are. I think Range Voting is quite ok for opinion polls and corresponding fully non-contentious elections (e.g. www.imdb.com), but as soon as there is an element of competition Approval style voting is the likely outcome. Maybe we'll learn something about Approval and Approval style voting with the simulations. Juho Laatu > Jobst > Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
