I distinguish strategy criteria from embarrassment criteria. SFC, SDSC and FBC are strategy criteria, and are all-important for the best voting systems, in my opinion.
The Plurality Criterion is an embarrassment criterion only, and therefore isn't important to me. Yes, MMPO's Plurality violation is so outrageous that even I had to abandon MMPO. But no method fails Plurailty like MMPO. Here's how I answer about failure of embarrassment criteria: "If MDDA chooses someone in violation of Plurality, then that winner must be a remarkably well-like and un-disliked Plurality loser. S/he has no majority preferring anyone else to hir, and s/he is ranked by more voters than anyone else is, suggesting that s/he is acceptable to more people than anyone else is." MAMPO can have an easier handcount than MDDA, if most candidates are disqualified in the majority approval test. But MDDA is _much_ more proposable, simple and transparent than MAMPO.That's because MDDA's pairwise count part is in the majority disqualification test, while MAMPO's pairwise count part is in the final choice part, where it takes the form of a MinMax method, which makes it much more awkward and complicated and less transparent for most people. I'd much rather propose MDDA than MAMPO, in spite of the Plurality Criterion. By the way, the names MPOA (Majority Pairwise Opposition//Approval) and MAPO (Majority Approval//Pairwise-Oppositon) are simpler, briefer and bring out the symmetry between the two methods. Mike Ossipoff ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
