All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote like this:
Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected ... Range (0 - 100 scale): A: 100; B: 0; C: 0; D: 0 ... Preferential (IRV, Condorcet, etc): A>B=C=D=... Additionally, there are several instances which only binary input voting systems are reasonable. Complex systems are hard to adopt in low-educated underdeveloped countries. This system, called Improved Approval Runoff (IAR), has the goal to resist bullet voting through simple ballots. Description: 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few candidates as desired. 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, the most approved is elected. 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate - the most approved after a new count which the votes for the first one are reweighted to 1/2. 4) The winner is the candidate who receives a majority of votes on the second round. On computer simulations, the top-two approval runoff method selected more times the Condorcet winner than any Condorcet method. I think that IAR is slightly fairer than top-two approval runoff under real voters. Any comments? ________________________________ Diego Santos
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