>>1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is >> not, the Approval winner wins.
>Sure. That's been proposed many times. However, >it's not a very good method. First of all, it is >blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the >Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best >winner, by far. I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing affect all voting methods. Even in a two-candidate contest where every considerable method becomes Plurality, it's possible that the minority has stronger preference, so the winner is not the social optimum. (The only defense against this is the money voting, the Clarke-tax, which is - I think - treated also a little unjustly. At least the theoretical honor should be given for showing the possibility of strategy-freeness. And who knows, one day it can be proven even practical in some circumstances.) Peter Barath ____________________________________________________________________ Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
