Dear Steve,
> Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to
> make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the
> compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference
> intensity for A over C.
Sorry, I had just not read carefully the first time. Of course that
interpretation is consistent with what I had in mind, although I do not believe
that preference "intensities" belonging to different persons can be compared.
> (I am NOT saying there is a way to measure or
> compare sincere preference intensities or utilities suitable for input
> into a good vote tallying algorithm.) Without an assumption like this,
> we would have no reason to believe C is better than A for the society.
I think we have! The reasoning is this: 55% like A best, 45% like B best.
Therefore the "democratic benchmark" solution with which we should compare
prospective solutions is the lottery that elects A with 55% probability and B
with 45% probability. Now, all voters prefer C to this benchmark, but only 55%
prefer A to this benchmark and only 45% prefer B to the benchmark. From this
point of view C is a better solution than A is.
But I hope that also without this kind of reasoning it should be obvious that a
compromise which everybody likes almost as most as her favourite is a better
election outcome than one of the polar favourites...
> In other words, I believe
> we should confine ourselves to solving the "Tyranny of the Nearly
> Indifferent Majority" but not try to solve the "Tyranny of the
> Passionate Majority."
You suggest not to solve the problem of the "Tyranny of the Passionate
Majority"? Why? Shouldn't problems be solved?
> In the real world, it is much easier to elect a compromise than Mr.
> Lomax seems to be saying below, because in the real world the set of
> alternatives is not fixed to {A,B,C} by nature (nor by Jobst). Most
> procedures allow a very small minority to add an alternative to the set
> being voted on. (Under Robert's Rules of Order, for instance, only two
> people are required: one to propose alternative D and the other to
> "second" the proposal.)
It seems you and Adb ul-Rahman try to convince us that the problem I posed does
not exist in the real world. Well, if you really think so, I can't help it.
Anyway, it would be nice if you could still give a hint what kind of method you
would suggest to solve the stated problem *assuming* that the problem exists :-)
Yours, Jobst
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