Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
> Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial
> advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters,
> who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C.
>
> So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to
> compensate them for their loss.
That is certainly an interesting proposal. It seems to be based on the
assumption that the "just" solution is to elect A and that in order to get the
compromise, the minority should pay for it. Although that would probably solve
the problem, this is not how I think society should work: I don't think nearly
half of the electorate should pay the other half for getting what is the more
just solution in my eyes. Perhaps that is a difference in culture?
> The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities,
No, definitely not! I would never propose such a thing! I only said that those
who believe in such measures may interpret the given numbers in that way...
Yours, Jobst
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