>Diego Renato: I think that any method that violates later-no-harm (except asset voting) is likely to provide incentive to bullet vote and became a costly version of plurality.
--REPLY: careful. 1. It has sometimes been claimed, falsely, that IRV, because it enjoys "later no harm" offers no incentive to truncate your preferences (and to "bullet vote," i.e. vote plurality-style). A counterexample is http://www.rangevoting.org/rangeVirv.html#BramsEx see point 2 to see how the last voter type is better off bullet-voting. 2. So you (Diego Renato) should realize that "later no harm" is actually NOT the property you actually want. "Later no harm" is a property artificially created to make IRV look good, not a property created because it is inherently what is desirable. I think Renato actually wants something else: some kind of "no incentive to plurality-vote" property. 3. For voting methods whose ballots are NOT just rank-orderings, (e.g. approval and range voting) there is no such thing as "truncation." But it still is possible to cast a plurality-style range or approval vote. Will range and approval voters, therefore, just plurality-vote? No. We know that does not happen because it doesn't happen. Here are some range voting and/or approval voting election data http://www.rangevoting.org/OrsayTable.html http://www.rangevoting.org/FrenchStudy.html paper #82 at http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html in all these real-world studies, plurality style voting was quite rare, well in the minority. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
