Howard,
--- Howard Swerdfeger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Not peer review, but Ka ping yee of...
> http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
> has run sum simulations of election systems in 2d space
> and it shows quite a few problems with IRV.
> these guys (warren smith) also have some "Yee" diagrams
> http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/Pictures.html
> these show behaviour under different elections.
>
> In General IRV is bad at ties and near tie elections...in general
Thanks, but this is exactly what I have plenty of, but doesn't help,
since no one has verified it. I've made such diagrams myself (I actually
advised Warren on how to do it...). Personally even I do not agree that
Ka-Ping Yee's representation of Approval is realistic or meaningful. And
I don't think arguments about monotonicity are convincing to others.
I want sources that say IRV is undesirable because of its compromise
incentive and spoiler problem, and that these create some probability
of disincentive to nominate third party candidates.
Or, sources that say IRV suffers from a center-squeeze effect like FPP
does. This is bloody obvious, but who has stated it in print?
Kevin
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