My last message got mangled by the server, so here goes again!The scenario46 A>>B>C5 B>>A>C5 B>>C>A44 C>>B>Asuggests that ninety percent of the voters would rationally prefer a Random Ballot drawing over the sure election of Condorcet Candidate B.As for Approval; since the B voters are so evenly divided in their slight preferences relative to A and C, the A and C supporters might reasonably consider that each has a roughly fifty-fifty chance of winning if they leave the decision up to B supporters. So there would be little if any perceived advantage for approving B on very many ballots.However, these probability perceptions can be easily thrown off by deceptive polls and other disinformation disseminated by big money campaigns. This is a problem for Approval, but not for Random Ballot. In the category of deterministic methods, it is less of a problem for DYN (Delegable Yes/No) than for Approval, since DYN voters can afford to take reported probabilities with a grain of salt.Forest
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