Great, the link seems not to work directly. Then use: http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/mpsa/mpsa07/ select authors as research matter in the upper left and type Rouillon. It should work. By the way, Quebec MMP analysis report is published today: I'll provide the web site as soon I know it.
Thanks Yves, Steph. > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Stéphane Rouillon > To: Steve Eppley > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 6:36 PM > Subject: [Election-Methods] SPPA - support building engine > > > As asked for: a link to SPPA paper presented at Chicago in April 2007. > >http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/mpsa/mpsa07/index.php?click_key=1&PHPSESSID=a6f3cb6bdfc80d157cec9e6b5ffc0add > IRV is the single winner method used as engine to determine the support >for each candidate in this case. > > Steve Eppley a écrit : >Hi, > >It was not that I didn't read the rest of Stephane's earlier message. >It was his lack of clarity: His next example looked like he switched to >a different voting method, because his description of the tallying was >very different and he did not indicate he was using the same method >("Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs (Winning Votes)) Elimination."). > >At this point, I will assume Stephane does not intend to provide a >definition of that voting method nor a link to it, and I don't have time >to hunt in older messages to see if it was defined once upon a time. > >Regards, >Steve >------------- >Stéphane Rouillon wrote: > My advice to Steve is to read all an email before comments. >Cut-off were applied further building the counter-example in the part >he snipped... >Of course without cut-off, the original ordering method comes back. > >"meaningless winners which could not get elected with SPPA in the end." > >refers to the fact that the multiple-winner method will not >necessarily elect a candidate that received the most support >in a district. Again, it is a matter of considering an election as a >representative exercise and not as a battle. > >Stéphane Rouillon > >Steve Eppley a écrit : > Hi, > >Stéphane's latest example (immediately below) is very different from >his earlier example that I quoted (further below) which he tallied >using a voting method he called "Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs >(Winning Votes)) Elimination." His earlier example had no "approval >cutoffs" and his latest example appears to have no connection to >Ranked Pairs or Condorcet. Thus he hasn't provided a basis for >claiming my comment was wrong. > >My advice to Stéphane for when he sobers up (just joking) is to >reread his earlier example and then provide a clear definition of the >"Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs (Winning Votes)) Elimination" >method, or a link to its definition, so we will know what voting >method he was writing about. Based on the name he gave it and from >his earlier example, it appears (to me, at least) to be the method >that iteratively eliminates the candidate ranked last by MAM until >one remains. > >The thrust of my comment was that since MAM satisfies Peyton Young's >LIIA criterion, it follows that MAM elects the same candidate as the >more complex voting method that iteratively eliminates the candidate >ranked last by MAM until one candidate remains. Was Stéphane >claiming this is wrong, when he wrote that my comment was wrong? > >Second, I do not understand what he meant where he wrote, >"meaningless winners which could not get elected with SPPA in the >end." I suspect it is not relevant to the comment I made. > >--Steve >--------------------------------- >Stéphane Rouillon wrote: > > First Steve's comment is wrong as shown below: A > B > C. > > 33: A > B | C >31: B > C | A >33: C | A > B >3: B | A > C > >C is eliminated with 33 votes as support. >B is eliminated with 34 votes as support. >A is last eliminated but receives no rallying voters and finishes >with 33 >votes as support. > B wins. > > Second, as written before, scores or supports matter, not >meaningless winners which could not get elected with SPPA in the end... > >S.Rouillon > >Steve Eppley a écrit : > > Hi, > >Assuming I'm correctly understanding a voting method Stéphane >Rouillon used in a recent message (excerpted below), which he >called "Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs(Winning Votes)) >elimination," it is unnecessarily complicated because it chooses >the same winner as Ranked Pairs(Winning Votes), which of course is >simpler. >Ranked Pairs(Winning Votes), also known as MAM, satisfies H Peyton >Young's criterion Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives >(LIIA). One implication of LIIA is that elimination of the >last-ranked candidate(s) does not change the ranking of the >remaining candidates. > >By the way, a different criterion has been masquerading as LIIA in >Wikipedia. Peyton Young defined the real LIIA in his 1994 book >Equity In Theory And Practice (if not earlier). > >--Steve >-------------------------------------- >Stéphane Rouillon wrote: >-snip- > > > Let's try a counter-example: > >3 candidates A, B, C and 100 voters. >Ballots: >35: A > B > C >33: B > C > A >32: C > A > B > >Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs(winning votes) ) elimination >would produce > >at round 1: >68: B > C >67: A > B >Thus ranking A > B > C >C is eliminated. > >at round 2: >67: A > B is the ranking >B is eliminated > >at round 3: >A wins. > > -snip- >---- >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for >list info > > ---- >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >info > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >---- >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > ---- >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
