A correction: 2007/12/22, Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Ian, > > I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to > comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an > election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative: > > "If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser". > > Like Nanson and Baldwin, this method meets Smith but violates monotonicity > and cloneproofness, but opposite to Borda elimination, it meets summability > and dominant mutual third.
Where I said "dominant mutual third" I really would wanted to say "third burial resistance". This criterion is not met by Schulze neither MAM. 2007/12/21, Ian Fellows <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > Markus, > > > > Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the > > best > > method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it > > that > > the best method isn't used? > > > > You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet > > criterion > > is the correct one when determining the outcome of single winner > > elections, > > and yet they are not used in any public election anywhere in the world. > > Though the current best methods (Yours, and Ranked Pairs), are > > relatively > > new, Condorcet methods have been around for quite a long time. So the > > newness of the methodology can't be the reason. The difficulty in > > changing > > an electoral system once it has been started certainly plays a part, but > > IRV > > seems to be making significant inroads in this area whereas Condorcet > > methods are not. > > > > I think the answer lies in looking at the organizations that have > > adopted > > the Schulze method. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method > > > > 44 organizations, and almost all of them are technically oriented. > > > > The answer seems to me to be clear, complexity. Though beat-path is the > > best > > methodology, and the one that I would use in any professional > > organization > > that I was a part of, it violates a principle of democracy. For an > > election > > method to be "of the people" the people must be able to understand its > > implementation. They must be able to understand why one leader was > > picked, > > and not another, and further, how their ballot played a part in that > > decision. > > > > This begs that question of whether there is a Condorcet method simple > > enough > > for everyone to understand, and yet having the greatest number of > > desirable > > properties. Perhaps one answer might be in Borda-elimination methods. > > They > > are the only ones to have ever been used in public elections, and have > > very > > little added complexity when compared to IRV. IRV has had a great deal > > of > > success in being adopted, so we know that voters can handle something as > > complex as IRV. > > > > Borda-elimination also stacks up favorably when compared to anything but > > ranked pairs and Schulze. The only criteria that it doesn't pass are > > local > > IIa, monotonicity and independence of clones. > > > > non-monotonicity, while weird, doesn't imply that the candidate chosen > > is in > > any way inferior to a candidate chosen under a monotonic rule. I would > > have > > thought that the main reason why you would want a monotonic rule is so > > that > > people would accept it as valid. This does not appear to be an issue as > > IRV > > is non-monotonic, and is well liked. There are some possible issues > > regarding additional sussepability to strategy, but I'm not sure how > > serious > > those would be. Also, like all condorcet methods, Borda-elimination is > > monotonic if there is a Condorcet winner. > > > > local IIa and independence of clones are not passes, and this is an > > inferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet > > winner. I > > seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where > > vote-splitting is rampant. > > > > So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up > > for > > by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty > > understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has > > been > > adopted by any government? > > > > > > Ian > > http://thefell.googlepages.com > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ]On Behalf Of > > Markus Schulze > > Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method > > for public elections? > > > > > > Dear Ian Fellows, > > > > the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate > > monotonicity and independence of clones. They also > > violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not > > in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the > > result of the elections. > > > > When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere, > > you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and > > the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the > > supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore, > > it will not be sufficient that you argue that the > > proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will > > rather have to argue that the proposed method is the > > best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose > > a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of > > criteria. > > > > Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to > > try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as > > possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda. > > The best method according to IRV's underlying heuristic > > will always be IRV; the best method according to the > > underlying heuristic of the Borda method will always > > be the Borda method. It makes more sense to propose > > a Condorcet method that stands on its own legs. > > > > Markus Schulze > > > > > > > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > > info > > > > > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > > info > > > > > > -- > ________________________________ > Diego Santos > > -- ________________________________ Diego Renato dos Santos Graduado em Ciência da Computação Integrante do projeto Wireless(Petrobras/DEE-UFCG)
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