Dave,

--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as:
>       Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso 
> (matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso
> is 
> better than worst).
>       Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as 
> Approval offers.
>       IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally 
> awarding disappointing choices as to winner.
>       Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks.  Ratings 
> give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign
> them effectively.

"Assign them effectively"? In Range that means rating everybody either the
maximum or minimum score. That's not "fine control" surely. It doesn't
matter how many buttons it has if you're not supposed to push them.

I would rather say that Range hopes that voters *do not* learn to assign
the ratings effectively. Or if they learn how, they choose not to.

Kevin Venzke


      
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