Kevin, Your "Improved Condorcet//Approval" (ICA) method I take attempts to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets Sincere Favourite (your version of FBC).
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critsf 48: A>B 02: B 49: B=A 01: C A>B 48-2, A>C 97-1. In this virtual 2-candidate election, ICA elects B. To fix this, I suggest: "3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as approval. If the Top ratings winner T has a TR score higher than T's maximum pairwise opposition score then elect T. Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner." This seems to be a pure improvement. What do you think? Chris Benham Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address. www.yahoo7.com.au/y7mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
