Maybe more exact is: "3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as approval.
If any there are any candidates whose Top ratings score is higher than his or her maximum pairwise opposition score, elect the one of these with the highest TR score. Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner." Chris Benham Chris Benham wrote (Apr.28): Kevin, Your "Improved Condorcet//Approval" (ICA) method I take attempts to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets Sincere Favourite (your version of FBC). http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critsf 48: A>B 02: B 49: B=A 01: C A>B 48-2, A>C 97-1. In this virtual 2-candidate election, ICA elects B. To fix this, I suggest: "3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as approval. If the Top ratings winner T has a TR score higher than T's maximum pairwise opposition score then elect T. Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner." This seems to be a pure improvement. What do you think? Chris Benham Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address. www.yahoo7.com.au/y7mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
