Hi, --- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Dear Juho, > > this sounds nice -- the crucial point is that we'll have to analyse what > strategic voters will vote under that method! Obviously, it makes no > sense to the A voters to reverse their C>B preference since that would > eliminate C instead of B and will result in B winning instead of C... > > Did you look deeper into the strategic implications yet?
If under the PR method it can happen that you don't want to vote for a "sure winner" then I guess in this method it might be the case that you don't want to vote against a "sure loser." If so, that could aggravate the problem of electing poor compromises. I suspect strategically this method is a lot like antiplurality in its instability, with voters frequently wishing they had voted differently once they see the results. Kevin Venzke __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? En finir avec le spam? Yahoo! Mail vous offre la meilleure protection possible contre les messages non sollicités http://mail.yahoo.fr Yahoo! Mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
