Satisfaction analysis should help answer your question....
Diego Santos a écrit :
I was not enough clear when i wrote my previous email. The '>>' is not
a real approval mark on the ballot, it was only a "satisfaction limit"
from each voter. I am arguing that not always the Condorcet winner is
the one that maximizes happiness of the people, as Jonathan pointed.
A "approval quorum" rule will avoid low utility CW to win. And,
opposit to Jonanthan argument, an approval cuttoff does not add too
much complexity: it is like a hypothetical candidate NOTB (none of the
below).
2007/12/11, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>:
On Tue, 11 Dec 2007 12:20:49 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:05 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
>
>>Jonathan,
>>
>>--- Jonathan Lundell < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> a écrit :
>>
>>>...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters saying A
>>>is
>>>good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me that
the A
>>>voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is very
bad.
>>>Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot, just that
>>>we're being told a little more about their opinions.
>>
>>In my opinion, to the extent that the effect of a ">>bad>verybad"
>>vote is
>>disregarded, the point of letting voters indicate such
preferences is
>>undermined anyway.
>
>
> I'm not advocating it as a ballot option, only as a meta-notation
> shorthand to give us kibitzers a little more information about the
> voters' utility functions.
>
>
>>
>>>In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is
evident.
>>>In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem
>>>unreasonable to me.
>>>
>>>The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no '>>'), we
>>>can't
>>>distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we should
>>>employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a complication to be
>>>avoided.
>>
>>In one sense I don't agree. If >> is allowed then apparently it's
>>safe to
>>vote ">>bad>verybad." If >> isn't allowed then voters will probably
>>be more
>>cautious, since the method could very well take them as serious if
>>they say
>>that bad is better than verybad.
>>
>>I tend to think that if B doesn't win in Diego's scenario, the
>>method is
>>second-guessing the voters. It either disbelieves the C voters'
>>preference
>>for B over A, or finds that there's something more important than
>>majority
>>rule.
>
>
> There's a reasonable argument to be made (hardly originally by
me) on
> either side of the question of whether a compromise candidate is
> sometimes (or always) better to the candidate of one faction in a
> close election.
>
> If the vote were:
>
> 53 A
> 47 C
>
> ...we'd shrug and call it a fairly close election, or at least no
> landslide, and forget about it, even if all 100 voters strongly
> disapproved of the opposing candidate. If we introduce a third
> candidate whom the A and C voters despise only slightly less than C
> and A respectively, and end up with something like Diego's
profile, we
> have 100 (or 90 in that profile) unhappy voters instead of 47.
A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy.
C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than
installing A. A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least
avoided
installing C.
Probably A supporters will be too unhappy, because their favorite
candidate would win if B was not nominated.
>
> I'm not saying that it's unarguable, nor that the voting system
should
> somehow anticipate the situation (through the use of '>>', for
> example). I think it's a fuzzy case with no perfect answer, and
that
> we don't really want to make the ballot more complex, or add to the
> possibilities for manipulation that such a rule would entail.
I'm just
> saying that it's not obvious that, in all cases, the best rule
is the
> one that lets B win.
Choices can be hard. Get far enough from a tie and A or C will
win. If
we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
<http://people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek>
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708
607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
--
________________________________
Diego Santos
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
