Kevin (and interested others),
I'm interested in reaction to this suggestion for a method:
Voters fill out ratings ballots with 4 or more fixed slots (or maybe
with the number of slots being the number of candidates plus 1 or 2).
(1) If the candidate T that is top-rated on the most ballots has a top-ratings
(TR) score higher than T's maximum pairwise oppostion (PO) score,
then elect T.
(2) If not, promote on all ballots any candidates in the next-lowest rating
slot to Top and recalculate TR and PO scores accordingly.
(3) Repeat steps (1) and (2) until there is a winner. End.
This is an extension to 4 or more slots of my Jan.2008 idea for modifying
Majority Choice Approval (MCA), which uses a 3-slot ratings ballot.
The idea is to keep the Bucklin virtues of meeting Majority for Solid
Coalitions,
Favourite Betrayal (and Sincere Favourite) and Minimal Defense and Plurality
(and my suggested "Strong Minimal Defense")*, while trading away Later-no-Help
for Independence from Irrelevant Ballots (IIB).
As you know I think it is better that LNHarm and LNHelp be in approximate
probabilistic ballance rather than there be either strong incentive to truncate
or
a random-fill incentive, so therefore I regard the "trade-off" I referred to as
really
a win-win.
Chris Benham
* Strong Minimal Defense: if more voters "vote for" (meaning rank or rate above
bottom) X and not Y than vote for Y, then Y can't win.
Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address.
www.yahoo7.com.au/mail
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