On Jun 25, 2008, at 21:05 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Jun 24, 2008, at 0:34 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
What do you mean by "methods that allow candidates to form a
tree like structure"? Something like delegable proxy, or just
preference ballots with parties instead of candidates? Or
nontraditional nested democracy (groups elect members to an
assembly - groups of assemblies elect members to a second-
level assembly, onwards up to global issues)?
I was thinking about the traditional party structure and
proportional methods and how they may provide quite exact
proportionality between parties but how they can not provide
proportionality in any more detailed level. In this set-up it is
possible to split one party e.g. to the green wing and others, and
then the green wing could consist of radical and moderate greens.
A vote to the radical greens (of this party) would be a vote also
to the green wing in general and to the party in general.
The point was that now you could have even the binary decisions
"stacked" in the party hierarchy (at least if the tree would be a
binary tree). In this model it would also make a difference if you
vote the green wing of the socialists or the socialist wing of the
greens (order of priority).
If the parties as well as their respective divisions (and
subdivisions) were to produce their own party lists, that would be
a whole lot of lists.
That could be one big poster where the candidates are listed on the
right hand side and the left hand side is used for representing the
tree structure (and the names of the parties and the subgroups).
One might be able to get the effect without all the lists by having
a candidate ranking option, similar to "voting above the line" but
with candidates instead of parties.
I'm not sure if I got this right. STV is one basic proportional
method where candidates are ranked. The tree structure is simpler in
the sense that the voter votes simply just one candidate. It may be a
problem to the voters to evaluate all the numerous candidates
separately (if there is no structure and no "lists"). The fact that
candidates themselves determine the order of inheritance and that the
structure is limited to a tree format may also be considered a
simplifying factor from the voter point of view (sets some
limitations too, but maybe not crucial). Candidates in a way commit
to the policy that they state (e.g. "I'll fight for socialism and
secondarily for green values"). The tree structure is interesting
also in the sense that it allows voters to influence and determine
the direction that each party will take better than currently typical
monolithic parties (proportionality is not provided inside the parties).
A voter voting for a radical green submits an approval or plurality-
type ballot for the radical green, and the system substitutes this
with "RadicalGreen1(Party F) > RadicalGreen2(Party F) >
ModerateGreen1 > .... > Mainstream1(Party F) > ... > Whoever(Party
X) > SomeoneElse(Party Y)". That is, the nesting is done implicitly
in the ranking substitution, after which the ranked votes are input
into your favorite multiwinner method.
I assume that the candidate provided the ranking order. This is more
flexible than the tree structure but also more confusing from the
voter point of view.
Fiji has btw had some problems with candidates (parties) that look
like representing X but their votes are inherited by candidates that
do not represent X. Reading all the inheritance lists (even more
lists) and understanding the impact of vote transfers was obviously
too difficult. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system_of_Fiji>
The substituted ranks (candidate-individual automatic how-to-vote
cards) would nest outwards, from the small wings to the
increasingly larger ones within the party itself, then on to other
parties in preference. In a sense, they are "lists" of their own,
and so the problem isn't completely avoided.
Are there some specific cases where the tree like inheritance order
is clearly not sufficient?
In an ideal world, one could argue that if voters assume a
candidate is acceptable (if not, why would they vote for them?)
then they could also reasonably assume that the candidate's premade
substitute rank can be trusted. But in reality one may pick a
candidate not because he's absolutely trustworthy, but because the
others are worse, and the method in any case amplifies central
power (like closed list PR does, and for pretty much the same reason).
The complexity of the inheritance lists, the amount of work that
voters need to do to find their optimal vote and the Fiji case make
the simple tree structure look more practical (although STV and the
substituted ranks (inheritance lists on automatic how-to-vote cards)
are more flexible). STV is used in practice though, so it can't be
overly difficult to the voters.
Juho
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