Saying it more carefully:
When ranking another candidate, this means giving the same rank to
all the equally best liked among those considered.
There can always be another pass at ranking, so it is never
necessary to include a candidate just because they must get ranked.
Whenever the remaining pool of candidates contains none that you
would prefer to have win over the others, you are DONE. Note that
positive liking is not involved - only better liking.
When a candidate that you did not rank wins, and you care, time to
consider whether you did adequate analysis of the pool - but can be a
simply strange election.
Rank best liked candidate with maximum rank.
Rank best liked remaining candidate at next rank. Repeat until no more to
rank.
Nothing above about approval cutoff. That has meaning in Approval, but
not here.
Causing or avoiding cycles is a tempting goal - generally impractical to
know enough to expect success at either.
Election characteristics can matter:
With the win expected to go to one, or one of a pair of, candidates,
the strays expected to lose are not worth great effort.
With several roughly equal candidates, careful analysis is more
important.
DWK
On Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:37:19 +0000 (GMT) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Brian,
(Sorry to everyone I haven't been responding to. My computer died and I'm
still trying to recover.)
--- En date de : Lun 30.6.08, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
De: Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Objet: Re: [Election-Methods] USING Condorcet
À: "Election Methods Mailing List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Dave Ketchum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Lundi 30 Juin 2008, 23h37
On Jun 30, 2008, at 9:51 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Condorcet provides for ranked approval for more than
one candidate.
This
DOES NOT justify trying to get voters to rank more
than they approve
of.
And, while I write above for voters to learn about
other candidates,
I do
not see demanding that they try harder to learn about
strays.
It's worth rating everyone because if you wind up not
getting any of
the ones you 'approve of' you can still have some
say in which of the
rest of them you get.
I don't entirely agree. I would rank below my strategically-determined
approval cutoff (if I suppose the same election could be held also under
Approval), but I wouldn't rank that much lower, and I don't think other
voters should either.
Two reasons for this.
1. If you rank everybody and are predictably sincere, burial strategy
by other voters is more likely to succeed against you. People who would
use this strategy need to have doubt about what you're going to do.
Truncating at the (strategically determined) approval cutoff is good at
this: The main effect is that voters don't rank all the frontrunners,
and burial strategy works basically by assuming one frontrunner will
get support from another.
2. If everyone is persuaded (or forced) to rank all the candidates that
they can, this would seem to add substance to the criticism that there
is no guarantee that "everybody's second preference" (etc.) is any good at
all. Typically my response to this criticism is that if a candidate is so
bad that his election would be cause to complain about the method, then
voters shouldn't be voting for this candidate in the first place. That
response doesn't work if voters will be advised to rank everybody they can.
(You can still argue that Condorcet gives the reasonable result, but to
critics it will still seem like a potentially terrible one.)
I should note that these points are only relevant to Condorcet methods
where truncation is useful in addressing these issues.
Kevin Venzke
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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