On Wed, 16 Jul 2008 18:31:04 -0000 Bruce R. Gilson wrote:
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, 15 Jul 2008 14:38:32 -0000
Bruce R. Gilson wrote:
[...]
As soon as you put in some cycle-resolving system, you will
downgrade the preferences of some of these 6 groups -- obviously
you have to, because that's the only way to break the cycle. And
the people in those groups will feel that the election mechanism
is disregarding their preferences (or at least weighting them
less than others' preferences). And that will be the scandal.
Saying it more clearly, for A+B+C as the simplest cycle:
Given six equal sized groups of voters:
A>B, B>C, and C>A can do an A>B>C>A cycle with 2/3 of the
strength of each group pushing the cycle forward and 1/3 acting as
a brake.
A>C, C>B, and B>A can do a similar A>C>B>A cycle.
Combine the two cycles and you still have a three member
cycle, again with a tie.
Stray far enough from equality and the weakest candidate has no
effect, leaving a two candidate race,
In between you have a headache for which the rules BETTER be
decided on before the election. This does not require favoring any
groups - vote counts are the proper basis for the decisions.
It does not require favoring any groups -- certainly that is so, but
whatever system is decided upon, there are going to be people who
PERCEIVE that they have been disfavored by the rules. Suppose you
have an A>B>C>A cycle and the cycle-breaking rules elect A. Then the
people who voted BCA and those who voted CBA are going to scream
bloody murder, because they see that their least-favored candidate
was declared the winner, despite the fact that it vis clear that C
(who was preferred by the first group and STRONGLY preferred by the
second) could have beaten him.
Any Condorcet cycle-breaking algorithm has to lead to the fact that
some votes count more than others, despite the fact that there was no
INTENT to do so. If it didn't, it would not break the cycle, because
the cycle is inherent in the way Condorcet scores are computed.
Your "some votes count more than others" seems to deserve more
thought. In most any election method the vote counts can be near a
boundary, encouraging second thoughts by those who voted on both
sides, while counts far from a boundary could not have been affected
by one or two voters voting differently.
Condorcet has some fixed boundaries, for which the above applies:
A beats each other candidate, winning the election.
In a cycle A, B, and C beat all others while each beats one of
the other two. Similar cycles are composed of more than three candidates.
How to resolve cycles is a topic for debate. Rules for this BETTER
get resolved before the election to decide what shall be considered fair.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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