Juho > Sent: Saturday, August 09, 2008 9:19 PM > It is not easy to use the monotonicity failures to intentionally > improve/falsify the results (in typical large public elections).
I would go further, with respect to typical large public elections, with thousands or tens of thousands of voters, and say that it is impossible for either a candidate or a voter to exploit the non-monotonicity defect in such an IRV election. It COULD be different when a committee of, say, ten people elects an office-bearer AND the members of that committee know a great deal about the likely voting preferences of all the member of the committee. Then it MIGHT be possible for a voter to exploit the non-monotonicity to help secure that voter's sincerely desired result. James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG. Version: 7.5.526 / Virus Database: 270.6.0/1601 - Release Date: 08/08/2008 09:02 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
