On 8/29/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Well, yes, but I meant something like that if you're switching from Meek > (numerical solution for nonlinear systems) to an election system with a > divisor component, then a single exponential equation might seem simple in > comparison. Of course you would have to explain it, but the society would > already be used to the idea that voting systems may have to be complex to > give good results, and thus would accept it (if they accepted the > explanation, or trusted those who accepted the explanation) more readily > than those who were not used to that.
However, Meek's method has actual benefits (in terms of preventing free-riding) over hand counted PR-STV. Changing the d parameter from 0.5 to 0.49.... has much less of a real effect. It is very much a dot the i's and cross the t's thing. > That could work. However, the NOTA list would have to be longer than the > ordinary list, I think, because in situations where NOTA ranks first, that > means that the candidates below NOTA are not considered good enough, and > thus by implication would not be considered good enough to give one's vote > (as an asset) to. Well, I was thinking that you pick one candidate as your representative. There is then an entirelly new election and that candidate casts a vote on your behalf. Candidates who stood in the first election and didn't get elected would probably be banned from standing again. > I don't even think it needs to be malicious. If voters have sufficiently > many opinions they compare the candidates on, that might cause honest > differences in the 4th rank and below. Averaging, by necessity, throws away > some of this data. Yeah. Any abuse would be between 'friends'. > Nor are thresholds in general. I don't like information being thrown out > like that, so if the point is to make for a more stable government, I'd > require a slight supermajority (50% + threshold + 1) and also have the > German solution to executive transiency - the opposition has to agree on the > composition of the executive before replacing it. I don't think that is how the German system works. My understanding is that they have a rule which says that the new executive must get a majority. Only 'constructive motions of no-confidence' are allowed. This is where the motion declares no confidence in the Chancellor *and* names a replacement. This is to avoid the situation where the Chancellor has resigned due to a motion of no confidence, but they can't agree on a replacement. > > In Ireland, the governing coalition always votes as a bloc. They have > > effectively "signed up" to the program for government document that > > they publish at the start of each new term. > > > > Maybe that's a reaction to the weakening of party loyalty that PR-STV > gives. Well, the concept of voting as a bloc exists in both UK and Irish politics. Apparently, the Irish were one of the first to use it, when trying to get Irish Home Rule. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_Parliamentary_Party > From a distance point of view, the elimination process removes some > candidates that are closer to the voters so that their "closest candidate" > become someone that pass the Droop quota. In theory, that should work, but > it's not perfect (as IRV, the single-winner case, shows most readily, though > the effect weakens with multiple winners). Right. Something like CPO-STV should help here as it is condorcet based. > > A single seat method should aim for the centre as that means that > > everyone is best represented rather than representing one side of the > > electorate. > > > > Does that mean Range is unsuitable for party list PR for the same reason -- > broadly, that single-winner methods are too center-focused for the party > list transformation to be any good? Well, RRV would be fine. I am not sure how you would use RV for party list systems. You could allow the voter to rate more than 1 party, and then divide by the sum of the ratings, but that isn't RV. It is just standard party list voting while allowing a voter split his vote between multiple people. One option would be to use RV for the intra list distribution. You vote for a party and then rate all the candidates in that party. RRV is then used instead of a simple party list. Ofc, that isn't summable. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
