Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On the other hand, approximating may make strategy more difficult. I > think Rob LeGrand wrote something about how approximations to minimax > Approval obscured the strategy that would otherwise work.
Yes, you're thinking of http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~legrand/legrand06fsm.pdf in which our polynomial-time 3-approximation to fixed-size minimax is shown to be nonmanipulable. Exact FSM on the other hand is both manipulable and NP-hard to compute. I'm now at COMSOC '08 in Liverpool: http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/~pwg/COMSOC-2008/ Many interesting talks. I'm told the papers will be available on the website sometime after the conference is over. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
