I erred if I wrote it is ridiculous to nominate clones unless one can
predict before the election that a
tie will occur.
What I tough I wrote is : it is ridiculous to bother with an clone
independent tie-breaker if one considers a clone dependent electoral system.
Using a Condorcet method for example ensures a clone independent resolution,
thus different computers should always end up to the same winner despite
ties if they both use the same reproductible (but equiprobable or fair)
tie-breaker.
Although I have a lot of admiration for Forest and Jobst work, I cannot
accept the use of random non-reproductible ballot selection for tie-breakers
(or for winner designation even more) because it kills the validation of the
process. If the process of designation of the winner can be repeated ad
nauseam, fraud can be achieved only by corrupting the ballots database. It
then becomes a lot easier for electoral managers to ensure an honest result.
In the other case, anyone should be able to know in advance how the random
ballot is selected to thrust the electoral process. If it uses a definite
predictible and reproductible method, frauders will try to get several
favorable ballots as the tie-breaking numbered ballot. If it uses a
non-reproductible method, frauders will try to taint that one time process.
Thus I favor unpredictible but reproductible (but still equiprobable)
tie-breakers as the one presented previously, which works for small groups
and without any opportunity to influence a chairperson. It is random only
because it uses the election data which nobody should know in advance.
From: Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Random and reproductible tie-breaks
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2008 06:36:50 -0700
Hi,
Raph Frank wrote:
Stéphane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
-snip-
Tie-breakers have no need to be clone-independent. You cannot predict a
tie
will occur
before the election and it would be ridiculous to strategize on this
hypothesis.
In fairness, tie breaks are a low probability issue in any case. If
you are going to do them right, you might as well do them fully right.
Raph seems to be saying it's just an aesthetic value for the tiebreaker to
be independent of clones. I believe it's not just aesthetic. Stephane
erred when he wrote it is ridiculous to nominate clones unless one can
predict before the election that a tie will occur. All that's needed for
nominating clones to be strategically sensible, assuming the cost of
nominating clones is low, is that the probability of a tie is not
negligible. The probability of a tie is typically not negligible when
voting within small groups (committees, councils, legislatures, etc.) and
the cost of nominating clones in small groups is typically tiny, which
means it can be strategically sensible to nominate clones if the tiebreaker
is not independent of clones. It's a form of insurance against a low
probability undesired event.
Even if one's focus is on large public elections, before asking the public
to adopt the method in public elections it may be crucial for the voting
method to first develop a track record of satisfaction among many small
groups. Hence the tiebreaker ought to be independent of clones (or should
be close enough to independent that the probability of gaining by
nominating clones is negligible).
I don't know that the tiebreaker used within small groups must be identical
to the tiebreaker that would be advocated for large elections. For
example, in small groups a seniority system is common; typically a
chairperson casts the tiebreaking vote. Fortunately for us, that
tiebreaker provides clone independence with repeatability and no
randomness.
Here's another tiebreaking option. It's typical for groups to choose the
status quo alternative when it's tied. Perhaps it would be acceptable to
break ties based on the order of nomination (treating the status quo as
first nominated, when it's an alternative). This tiebreaker wouldn't
provide a strict independence of clones, I think, but it may be near enough
to clone independent to make it strategically hard or pointless to nominate
clones. It too has the desirable attributes of repeatability and
non-randomness.
In a more recent message in this thread, Raph wrote:
Also, if there was a tie, then odds are that there is only 2 people
involved, so it doesn't really matter about clones.
I don't understand why Raph wrote that. Assume a tie involves two
alternatives, and assume the voting method (up to but not including the
tiebreaker) is independent of clones. By nominating clones of one (or
both) of the two tied alternatives, the tie can be changed so it involves
more than two. It follows that it can matter whether the tiebreaker is
independent of clones.
Regards,
Steve
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