On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 19:45:14 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For some reason, I didn't receive Dave Ketchum's reply to my post about
the Condorcet party. So let's try this again, indeed.
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 00:05:28 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
My goal is using Condorcet, but recognizing that everything costs
money, wo we need to be careful as to expenses.
Thus I see: Condorcet as the election method. But then see no
value in a "condorcet party". Also then see no value in
primaries, but know parties see value in such.
The idea of having a Condorcet party is to gradually transform
Plurality elections into Condorcet elections.
Disturbing existing elections by marrying in something from Condorcet
seems very destructive considering possible benefits, so how about:
Run a phantom Condorcet election with current candidates before the
existing voting.
Candidates can drop out if they choose: Third party candidates have
little to lose. Major party candidates risk static as to why they did
not dare.
Those who choose to, vote via internet.
Thus we have ballots to count and report on as a sort of poll.
I was demonstrating Condorcet so:
Get NEAR a real election, as something to discus.
Do REAL Condorcet, since that is what is being sold.
But DO NOT marry into the real election, for that makes more headaches grab
I expect to be worth the pain.
Thus a poll, which is something to do fitting the above. Do not worry
about biases - just admit they likely exist in the way the poll is done
(though Condorcet actually used as a method would be concerned with such).
If you're going to have a poll, you don't need the Plurality shell;
that's true enough. But if you're a third party and you're seeing your
rate go to close to zero, then uniting with other third parties under a
Condorcet "party" could improve your chances, because at least the third
parties aren't splitting the votes among themselves anymore.
For polling, I would advocate "ordinary" polling, because internet polls
would be colored by the effect that those who have good internet
equipment would affect the results in a disproportionate manner. So
could foreigners or hacked computers, although in reality those probably
wouldn't be much of a problem.
"Ordinary"? I picked internet because I thought I saw usability and value
at affordable expense.
Perhaps internet voting biases could be fixed by having a "vote by
party" adjustment like real polling organizations do. That is, if 53% of
the people are Democratic, then all Democrat-first voters count for 53%
of the voting power in the poll, and so on. But that faces another
problem, because many of those "Yes, I like Democrats" replies (that
were used to derive the 53%) may be a result of the strategic vote
nature that Plurality encourages.
I duck adjustments because I do not want voters thinking of such unless
they are into an election method where such actually need to be attended to.
And no value in runoffs - Plurality needs runoffs because of the
way voters cannot express their thoughts - but Condorcet has no
similar problem.
Runoffs are not perfection even in Plurality - look at the recent
French election for which voters thought of rioting when neither
runoff contender was popular.
You're replying to yourself, but I'll agree with you here. Plurality
plus runoff is not perfect, but it's much better than Plurality without
runoff. To make a general observation, runoff weakens strategy, and
Plurality is filled with strategy (least of two evils). Runoff doesn't
eliminate the strategy, but then it can't, no matter what voting system
it is paired with.
With Condorcet they offer little possible value - every voter could
rank A>B, A=B, or B>A at the same time as doing any other desired
ranking.
For public elections I think it's likely that candidates won't
strategize enough to necessitate further hardening against strategy. Not
everybody agrees, and I'm simply saying that I can see how someone would
argue in the favor of having a runoff even with a Condorcet method.
Also, if there is no CW there are at least three candidates in a near
tie - want to put the N candidates in a "runoff"?
I don't know - is that the case for Plurality ties with Plurality+runoff?
Go back to the French election - because multiple "good" candidates divvied
up the "good" votes, a couple oddballs graduated to the runoff.
Here the voters can more completely express their desires, meaning we are
closer to perfection without runoffs.
Also, how many contenders permitted in the runoff? A cycle can describe
three or more in a near tie.
Condorcet runoffs may have value if the people decide to play dirty
and always use strategy. Since the runoff must be honest (with only
two candidates, the optimal strategy is honesty), it hedges the
risk since the best of the two will always win.
How much strategy need concern us with Condorcet? The plotters need
an accurate picture of their starting point. The plotting is complex
because of the tournament counting. Then they must advertise their
plot to their friends while keeping that a secret from their enemies.
I'm rather thinking of uncoordinated strategy, like Burial, here.
How do plotters successfully strategize in this environment?
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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