Chris Benham sent this to me. I think he meant to send it to the entire list; I've made the same mistake.
Reply to follow. --- On Sun, 10/12/08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score > To: "EM" <[email protected]> > Cc: "Aaron Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Sunday, October 12, 2008, 11:01 AM > Aaron, > I agree that not electing a voted CW is undesirable, and > any method > that fails the Condorcet criterion needs to be justified by > complying > with at least one desirable criterion that isn't > compatible with Condorcet. > > "Low social utility (SU)" Condorcet winners with > little solid support and > depend for their status as the CW on weakly-held lower > preferences can > begin to look quite chimera-like and not necessarily the > only legitimate > winner. > > One ok Condorcet method is Smith,IRV: voters strictly rank > from the > top however many candidates they wish, before each normal > IRV > elimination check for a candidate X that pairwise beats all > the other > remaining candidates, elect the first such X to appear. > > Is this what you mean by "Smith/IRV"? Or did you > mean "Smith//IRV"? > > I'm not sure if you suggested otherwise, but all > methods that meet the > Condorcet criterion are vulnerable to Burial strategy. > > Chris Benham > > > > Aaron Armitage wrote (Sat.Oct.11): > Condorcet methods are the application of majority rule to > elections which > have more than two candidates and which cannot sequester > the electorate > for however many rounds it takes to produce a majority > first-preference > winner. If we consider majoritarianism an irreducible part > of democracy, > then any method which fails to elect the CW if one exists > is unacceptable. > > Which particular method is chosen depends on what you want > it to do. For > example, if we at to make it difficult to change the > outcome with > strategic voting Smith/IRV would be best, because most > strategic voting > will be burying a potential CW to create an artificial > cycle in the hopes > that a more-preferred candidate will be chosen by the > completion method. A > completion method which is also vulnerable to burial makes > this worse, but > Smith/IRV isn't because it breaks the cycle in a way > the ignores all > non-first rankings. > > > Make the switch to the world's best email. > Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
