On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 1:32 AM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Raph, > > --- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >> I think Warren has some simulations where the voters are >> spread over >> 1-2 axes. (He can comment). My understanding is that >> there are lots >> of different distributions. > > Ok. That is better. But you still have the problem that it's open to > endless debate, what exactly the realistic simulation method is.
Right, Warren's proposal is to try lots of different variations. A method that scores best under lots of different assumptions is likely to be best. Ofc, even then, he may not have covered enough search space. > But this ignores the fact that parties still want to try to win the > election. If they back candidates at random, they could conceivably hold > on to frontrunner positions, but they wouldn't generally win, so they > don't do this. One option here is to do what parties actually do and hold a plurality primary. In fact, lots of different primaries election types could be tested. > It is still a problem to take this interpretation of FPP as a starting > principle to measure *all* rank ballot methods. The advantage is that it can be easily applied to voters with random utility. It automatically splits them into 2 groups. > I am not sure I've seen the other thread but I'll look for it. It was the suggestion that you pick 2 candidates as the top 2 and then test if it is stable by allowing each voter to change his vote one at a time. > Perhaps... I've never written a simulation to study nomination incentive > specifically, but I have written e.g. a FPP simulation, in which > voters stop voting for a candidate (in the polls leading up to the > election) when the calculated benefit to the vote disappears. And in > FPP there is no way for the benefit to come back (in contrast to, say, > Approval, which in my simulations of the same sort had the potential to > never arrive at stability). If there isn't a condorcet winner, then you get instability. I remember running sims on the "Rank your favourite of the top 2 and all you like better" strategy and it is unstable, if there isn't a clear condorcet winner. This is a representation of approval's condorcet seeking behaviour. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
