Many members of this list prefer a Condorcet method to any other voting method, especially if it meets Smith. But how vulnerable are ranked methods to strategic voting?
Consider these two assumptions: 1. Sincere Condorcet cycles would are too rare if used in real elections. 2. Strategies are somewhat common in contentions elections. Compromising is almost unnecessary in River, Schulze or Ranked Pairs, but these methods are vulnerable to burying. And still if a sincere Condorcet winner exists, these methods have a possibility to elect a Condorcet loser, because only rankings don't provide enough information to find the sincere winner in all situations. I don't have a proof, but I think that if a sincere Condorcet winner exists, Smith//approval is the only method resistant to both compromising and burying strategies. This property is valid in all 3-candidate scenarios. Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find a winner. -- ________________________________ Diego Renato dos Santos
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