2008/10/19 Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:18 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Maybe I haven't read closely enough. I thought the method was to simply > > have a runoff between the top two approved candidates. > > > > In the example mentioned, it didn't seem to me that anybody had majority > > approval, in which case it isn't clear who would win a runoff. Maybe I > > was misreading the scores as actual ballots. > > I meant that under strategy, the effect of clones should be reduced. > If A is cloned, then the B + C supporters can react by only approving > B, so B gets through. When there is only one A, then there is less > incentive for C's supporters to support B. > > Ofc, if there is ideal strategy, then there is no need for the run > off, as the voters will just pick the condorcet winner directly.
For this reason, the runoff is conducted if a majority consent (approval) doesn't exist. The reason of runoff is to reach a majority winner if many people vote in plurality style, like TRS. I didn't use rankings because IAR was intended for people with low knowledge in underdeveloped countries. When ballot complexity is not a problem, I prefer ranked or rated methods. > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > -- ________________________________ Diego Renato dos Santos Mestrando em Ciência da Computação COPIN - UFCG
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