On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:30 AM, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Well, it depends on how popular the candidate is. There would be some >>> candidates who can disregard primary results and some who can't. It >>> only works for very popular candidates. A reasonable number of >>> candidates wouldn't be able to pull it off. >> >> Just because they can't pull it off won't stop them from trying. I >> think the only reason candidate accept the results of primaries is >> because they are forced to. The obstacles facing an independent >> candidate are formidable. They aren't prevented from running for want >> of trying. > > Right, but there is a difference between being prevented due to > logistical problems and it being illegal. > >> What I am saying is, without legal force, primaries would be very >> different. I was trying to say that my earlier criticism of primaries >> does not apply to this because it candidates are not coerced into >> participating in the primary. > > Candidates aren't coerced into participating in the primaries, they do > it because the want the party nomination.
Because they cannot even run otherwise. I know it isn't the same as a gun to your head, but it wouldn't even occur if they didn't have an artificial monopoly on power. > > If the parties ran their own private primaries, then they candidates > would still have to participate if they want the nomination. There would be more competition at least. > >> They can run without participating at >> all in the world absent the add-ons to FPTP. > > I think you underestimate the value of having a major party nomination > in FPTP. No matter how it works, the nomination of one of the two > major parties is almost essential to winning. The only people who > might be able to get around it are previous winners/incumbents. I think you underestimate the ego of candidates. They probably would run if they could. > >> I said this because I don't see it accomplishing anything. First of >> all the current system does not allow transfers, so that is pretty >> much out of the question. Second I don't think it's going to give so >> much power to people who weren't elected by name in the first place. > > It does allow transfers. If you were elected as an Elector for the > Green party, you are perfectly allowed to vote for the Republican > candidate and can accept instructions based on the outcome of the > Green-Republican negotiations. Ofc, in some states, that would be > illegal. There's the anti-faithless elector law... but that isn't a transfer. It's an insincere vote. You only get one shot at making your vote if you are an elector. That makes it far inferior to even single winner asset voting. > >> I'm not sure that any modfication to asset voting is sufficient to >> solve your problem. I think the faults that plague IRV plague Asset >> Voting as well (albeit to a lesser extent because of the restrictions >> placed on who you can vote for). > > Some of the benefits are that the votes are transferred based on > intelligence/tactics, this makes it potentially more resistant to > strategy. No, it makes strategy the norm. > > Think of it like declared strategy voting, except you pick a person to > implement your strategy. That would arguably make it easier, in fact incredibly simple, to vote strategically, but do you actually want that to happen? > >> Compared to FPTP, it is about as expressive except you haven't a clue >> how your vote will transfer in the future. > > If you vote for one of the expected top-2, you would probably be sure > that he would keep your vote. Which would ruin the point of asset-voting to begin with. > > Trusting elected officials is part of representative democracy. Trusting voters is part of democracy. Why force them to trust candidates more? ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info