Dear Raph, you answered to Greg: > > 1) Using Bayesian utility, randomness is worse than FPTP. > > > > This is a pretty powerful indict, depending on how often the method > > has to resort to random ballot. > > Hmm, I am not sure how true that is. The randomness in those > simulations is picking a random candidate. > > Random ballot should be superior to random candidate.
That clarifies the claim a bit. Of course, picking each option with equal probabilty is crap since it doesn't use any preference information at all. That's obvious. Random Ballot is very different from that. The simulations I will present this weekend show that Random Ballot usually performs quite well from the social utility perspective. > It isn't entirely. There randomness creates an incentive to approve > compromise candidates. This means that it isn't like pure approval. > A 55% bloc that refuses to compromise and thus wins the approval > stage, will likely end up causing a compromise failure. That is > completely different to an approval election where a 55% bloc can > guarantee a win. Absolutely! > I think that finding an acceptable compromise is an important point. > The specific method is separate from the concept that you can allow > voters to in effect trade their winning probability. Although that might be interesting too! One could imagine a method in which voters delegate their decision power to a small number of representatives who will then negotiate and trade the winning probabilities they represent. > Strategy needs to be tested. The example that was used was a 3 > candidate race, finding a compromise is harder when there is more > candidates. Yes, definitely. I hope someone will help with that analysis! Yours, Jobst ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
