Thanks for providing another case to show how plurality voting does not solve the spoiler effect. Neither does IRV. This has zip to do with monotonicity.
Look up all the definitions again. Kathy On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 12:50 PM, Stéphane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Let us try a language you understand: > > - more voters prefer B to C > > - a fraction of those voters will vote for A because they even prefer A to > other candidates > > - thus C can get elected because of vote-splitting between A and B > > Even if more voters prefer B to C, the result is that C wins over B. This is > clearly non-monotonic. > This is a typical vote-splitting case using FPTP. > > Now do you understand in what reality we live today? > I do. This is why I consider alternatives. > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
