Of course! Thank you very much. I was not aware of the "poorest first"
variant and thought that asset voting always involves a negotiation
after the voting.
So, it could be called "automatic bottom-up asset voting" or so...
Diego Santos schrieb:
I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner "poorest first"asset
voting with predefined lists.
2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
Hi Kristofer,
That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV.
I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the
ranking from which the vote transfers are determined. The idea is to
keep it maximally simple for the voters: they still vote for only
one candidate.
I now realize that it is also different from STV in an important
respect: there is no transfer of excess votes!
What I want with this method is a maximally simple multi-winner
method that does not rely on lists but is focussed on individual
candidates and that makes sure that all large-enough minorities are
represented. It is not important that it results in proportionality,
hence it needs no transfer of excess votes.
Perhaps this is actually a new method? If so, what would we call it?
Jobst
I don't think it has a
formal name, but here's how I've defined (naive) multiwinner
adaptations in my simulations:
Take single-winner method X. Produce a social ordering, then if
there are k winners to be elected, pick the k highest ranked on
the social ordering, and elect them.
The social ordering of IRV is opposite of its elimination order:
the one who's eliminated in the first round is ranked last, and
so on.
--
That is, unless "the next candidate on her list" is the next
candidate on the *candidate*'s list, in which case it would be a
sort of STV-Asset/Party-list hybrid.
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________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
Mestrando em Ciência da Computação
COPIN - UFCG
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