Hi Adb ul-Rahman,
still, Asset Voting is majoritarian and therefore not democratic. The
reason why we have been studying methods with chance components (that
is, non-deterministic methods) is that we wanted to find a democratic
method, i.e. one that does not give any subset of the voters (no matter
how many they are) total decision power.
Of course, Asset Voting can easily be modified to achieve this: After
the inter-candidate negotiations, not Plurality but Random Ballot is
used for the final decision.
Yours, Jobst
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax schrieb:
At 05:15 PM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If you think the risk is too great even so, have a preface adjustment
where all candidates that fall below a threshold of first votes are
eliminated. The threshold should be very low, say 10. This will
introduce some compromising incentive, but again, that incentive
should be very slight.
Sure. However, if we are going to discuss pie-in-the-sky alternatives,
why not start with one that is spectacular in what it could accomplish,
that finesses the whole issue. Asset Voting. No need for any vote
threshold. Total representation in further process by choice.
For starters.
Election of an Assembly that is fully representative, where every seat
was chosen directly or indirectly (through chosen "electors") by N
voters, through voluntary cooperation rather than competition. And as to
the dregs, represented by those electors who can't get it together to
cooperate sufficiently, they are *still* represented in votes, if the
electors -- who are identified public voters -- can still vote directly.
Existence of a large fully representative body (the "electoral
college"), which can handle special elections, for example, efficiently
and cheaply.
Possibility of recall of "seats" who no longer represent those who chose
them.
Possibility of deciding all single-winner elections deliberatively,
which is probably, properly done, better than any known single-ballot
method.
And on and on.
And not a new idea. Asset Voting was described by Lewis Carroll (Charles
Dodgeson) in the early 1880s as a tweak on Single Transferable Vote, to
deal with exhausted ballots, allowing people without sufficient
information to rank more than one to still participate even if they
don't vote for one of the potential winners.
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