--- On Thu, 12/25/08, James Gilmour <[email protected]> wrote:
> From: James Gilmour <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2 > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, December 25, 2008, 4:31 PM > Aaron Armitage > Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2008 7:40 > PM > > To: [email protected]; > [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious > alternative 2 > > > > > > > I do not think you have to be anywhere near the > zero > > > first-preferences Condorcet winner scenario to be > in the sphere of > > > "politically unacceptable". I am quite > certain that the 5% FP CW > > > would also be politically unacceptable, and that > there would political chaos in > > > the government in consequence. The forces > opposed to real > > > reform of the voting system (big party > politicians, big money, media > > > moguls, to name a few) would ensure that there > was chaos, > > > and the electors would have an intuitive reaction > against a weak Condorcet > > > winner so they would go along with the demands to > go back > > > to "the good old ways". > > > > > > > That depends on how soon after the switch this > election happens. > > Getting "5% of the vote" is not a meaningful > concept in a Condorcet > > election; the meaningful concept is getting X% vs. a > particular other > > candidate. > > Nowhere did I or other previous contributors to this > discussion say anything about getting "5% of the > vote". What I (and others) > wrote (as shown above) was 5% of the first preference > votes. That is an important difference, but your next > comments suggests that > you may not think so. > I do see is as an important difference, in such a way as to preclude the use you're making of the first preferences. So to me it looks exactly like you're treating 5% of the voters ranking a candidate over every other candidate as getting 5% in the plurality sense. In a Condorcet context, the question isn't how many rankings over every possible alternative a candidate has, but how many rankings over this or that particular alternative. We should be asking that question anyway; using non-Condorcet methods means putting A in office despite knowing that a majority voted B > A. Unless we're introducing some formal recognition of preference strength (e.g., the extra vote I suggested in the other e-mail, CWP, or Range proper), there's no good reason to do that. > > > It's only by thinking in terms of plurality that > this looks > > like a problem, because in plurality you're > "voting for" one candidate > > rather than ranking them, a conception of voting that > IRV > > retains despite the fact that it allows multiple > rankings. > > It is not a question of my thinking in terms of plurality > - that is where our electors (UK and USA) are coming from. > It is my > experience (nearly five decades of campaigning) that UK > electors attach great importance to their first preference. > You may say > that's the result of bad conditioning, but if we want > to achieve real reform of the voting systems used in public > elections, these > are the political inconveniences we have to accommodate. > > James Well, I haven't spent very much time talking to UK voters, much less 50 years (having been alive only a little over half that long), but I haven't had any trouble selling ordinary Americans on Condorcet. I suspect you're playing up the LNHs. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
