Replying to Kristofer Munsterhjelm and Juho Laatu, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Ultimately, what we want is for the "representatives" to be > effectively aligned with the wishes of the people, while not being > disproportionally more aligned with the wishes of those who have > more power. How to do that isn't obvious, since the mechanisms > don't know about power. In the context of executive elections, where the issue is power itself, the voting mechanism actually does "know about power". It will be deeply informed by it, assuming the proxy structure and the power structure are in close alignment, as I predict (see original post, section 2). I figure we'll be voting for proxies partly *because* they are plugged into a power structure. So there would be no separating the cross influences - of votes on power, and power on votes - the two would likely join as a whole. (At first, I thought that was definitely a problem. Now I think it might be OK.) But if the question is influence peddling, I agree that the proxy structure offers more opportunities to a vote buyer - more than the periphery of voters anyway (see my other post) - but probably no more than the status quo. In one sense, there is *less* opportunity than the status quo, because the candidates and their supporters (proxies) will have less need of money. The voters will be informed by peer-to-peer communication and (where the issue is executive office) by the actual competence of power, so bills for mass advertising campaigns will be reduced. It might no longer cost millions to get elected, so there'll be less need for candidates to sell themselves. Juho Laatu wrote: > I note that flexible proxy systems are > in some respects also safer than current > systems with fixed representatives since > those changing proxies are harder to > contact and they are not really part of > the "fixed club of leaders" that may well > have lots of all kind of bindings and > dependences among them. I think Juho's argument is best supported in the context of normative voting, where the issue is the on-going construction of a norm, such as a law, and the typical proxy is also a drafter. In that context, vote shifts will be guided almost exclusively by the distribution of text in the population of drafters - attractive text content pulling in votes - and the anticipation of influencing that distribution - votes pushing text content. In such a shifting, fluid environment, it's hard to see where a corrupt (bought) drafter could hold influence. With no structural supports for her corrupted decisions, she'd get washed away in the general flow of votes. It would be different if people were voting for her - not because of her text content, or her drafting and consensus building skills - but on the basis of other, irrelevant factors. For example, she might be a popular Hollywood actress. Her fame would then give her an external support, and the relative freedom to write anything she liked into her text (suppose), and still retain a following among her irrational fans. She could therefore sell that freedom for money, if she was unscrupulous. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
