> > Oddly, the preceding design need not be altered. It remains > > essential. All we need is to add a separate, primary voting > > system, ...
Juho Laatu wrote: > I didn't yet quite understand what > parts of the old system are kept and > what will be replaced with the new > system. All is kept, nothing is replaced or altered. There is only the addition of a new primary system in the public sphere - no formal connection to government, or to political parties. > > with these counter-features: > > > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes > > Maybe mostly positive, but also > something negative. Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy with the government's voting systems (?). > > b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates > > You may need also some approval from > the citizens to become candidates. > (Or alternatively you could allow them > to indicate if they will not accept > the role of a proxy.) Candidature is a consequence of receiving a vote. There is no formal effect aside from receiving the vote. It's like you're standing on the street corner, and somebody says, "Hey, I know you. You're Juho Laatu. I think you'd make a great City Councillor!" So the person says, and there is no way to prevent it. And others may start to agree with him. You cannot stop people from proclaiming you as a *primary* candidate, and hoping to see your name on the ballot, come the next general election. (But you are under no obligation to stand for election, as a *general* candidate.) > > c) open ballot > > What was the reason why you consider > open vote to be a requirement? (or a > "counter-feature") I read your other post. I understand you are asking about the necessity of open voting at the periphery, among plain voters. You've been asking this question from the beginning, and it's been difficult for me to answer definitively. Now I see there's a big white space in the theory, where the answer should fit. I don't have the whole of it covered yet (been thinking about it, the last couple of days) but here's a sketch of it: There's difference when we speak in public, with an aim to mutual understanding or consensus. We are forced to take the view of the others to whom we are speaking. We are forced to be self-critical in anticipation of their challenges, to prepare ourselves to reasons for what we say, to back up the claims we make. There is a theory that ties these various types of claims to to various types of speech acts, and it's called formal pragmatics.^[TCA1] This has been tied to autonomy, rational agency and responsibility, to the effect that only a public speaker in this social context is an autonomous individual, a rational and responsible actor.^[1] A public vote is the formalization of a speech act, and is covered by these theories. The opinion of a private individual that is expressed as a public vote has a claim to truth, legitimacy and sincerity that a private opinion (not so expressed) has not. There is a connection between communicative reason (in these public utterances) and the rationalization of modern society. The rationalization of modern society is its division into specialized spheres and subsystems - like public sphere, private sphere, economic system, and administration system - that spin according to their own internal logics, and interrelate across interfaces. This correlates with our rationalization of voting systems, splitting them into separate systems of the public sphere (on one hand) and administrative system (on other) - each specialized for its place and purpose, and in communication with the other. So we modernize voting. There is a connection between human reason (how we moderns think and speak) and the rationalization of modern society. I do not understand it well enough, but there's a sense in which the universality of communicative action (its inclusion of others, and raising of validity claims) can bind together the fragmented pieces of modern society. It's the last "glue" that's left to us moderns. Both the fragmentation and the glue are enhanced by the addition of public voting. It separates out two voting systems (public and private) that work better when kept apart (but in communication). It also helps to separate the public sphere from the other parts of society, while simultaneously binding it to them. So we make modern society even more modern - ultra modern. There is a sense too in which this might further the critical theory of society. That type of theory is supposed to be both diagnostic of problems, and to propose remedies, but it tends to be weak on remedies these days.^[2] And it's traditional in critical theory that the remedy is in the evil - the spear of modernity must heal the wound of modernity.^[3] There is also the consideration that this type of public voting may be applied to a text that is broadly cultural, and yet has normative potential. What would it mean, for instance, if people were to begin voting on utopian visions of society? Is that another way to glue society together (science, art, politics, etc.) and steer the whole with a sense of purpose. Nobody has ever thought along these lines, so far as I know. But there are hints in Segal.^[4] (If above can be redacted, it would put real flesh on the theory.) > > d) voting on laws, too > > I read this as allowing individual > voters to vote directly too, without > any proxies between them and the > decisions (on laws and on anything). They can vote directly, but they will usually prefer to vote via the proxies (delegates). The effect is the same (because votes are shiftable), but it's easier to vote for/communicate with a delegate. A home owner hears of a proposed bylaw for property taxes. She knows nothing else about it, but she knows enough to cast a vote for her tax accountant. Later, she looks to see where that vote ends up - which *variant* of the proposed bylaw it has cascaded to. She asks questions of her tax accountant, and maybe thinks of shifting her vote, depending on the answers she receives. > Quite OK but I have some concerns > on what will happen in the tax > raise questions. It is possible that > the society would spend more than > save. Mistakes are possible. The pilot may turn the rudder too far. He will have to notice his mistake, and correct it. This is not easy with private voting, as private opinion is easily selfish. But it's hard for public opinion to be selfish - so theory tells us. Gross errors may be blocked by the control system. Council may pause for a long time if residents reach consensus on eliminating property taxes entirely. The Mayor will try to reason with them, explaining how garbage collection will stop, policing will be hampered, and protection racketeers will fill the vacuum... [TCA1] Jürgen Habermas. 1981. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1. Reason and Rationalization of Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy, 1984. Beacon Hill, Boston. [TCA2] Jürgen Habermas. 1981. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2. Lifeworld and System: a Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy, 1987. Beacon Hill, Boston. [1] Kenneth Baines. 2007. Freedom as autonomy. The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Edited by Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen. Oxford University Press. p. 578-580. [2] James Gordon Finlayson. 2007. Political, moral and critical theory: on the practical philosophy of the Frankfurt School. The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Edited by Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen. Oxford University Press. [3] From the Trojan Cypria, and Wagner's Parsifal. Above p. 648. [4] Howard P. Segal. 2005. Technological Utopianism in American Culture. Twentieth Anniversary Edition. Syracuse University Press. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info