OK. Then the model is one where the voters may have various opinions on various matters but that doesn't necessarily mean that they would have a complete ordering of the candidates.
I can imagine that I could have e.g. cyclic opinions on food when there are three alternatives and three properties that I consider important (e.g. low fat, sweetness, nice colour) and of which I have clear opinions. With these parameters my preferences could thus form a logical cycle. People have however also good problem solving abilities. If I'm in a restaurant sooner or later I'm usually able to make up my mind. Maybe by giving some weights to my preferences and then choosing my favourite food for today. I may also need to create opinions on topics that I had not thought before. As a result I may have mapped my (already existing and maybe newly generated) logical rankings of different properties to ratings (that are transitive by nature). What I mean is that it may quite OK to assume that people are able to find some preference order when voting. And therefore we can force them to do so. Juho --- On Fri, 23/1/09, Jobst Heitzig <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Jobst Heitzig <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed. > To: "EM" <[email protected]>, [email protected] > Date: Friday, 23 January, 2009, 4:51 PM > Dear Juho, > > > OK. I interpret this to mean that > "sincerity" > > referred to the sincere opinion that might > > not even exist. > > I did not mean to say the voter has no opinion. He may well > hold the opinion that, say, A is much better than B in some > respect, and B is much better than A in another respect, so > that neither is A preferable to B nor B to A nor are they > equivalent (equally preferable). This is just an ordinary > case of what some people pejoratively call > "incomplete" preferences. Or the voter may hold > the opinion that A is better than B in two of three > respects, B is better than C in two of three respects, and C > is better than A in two of three respects, so that A is > strictly preferable to B, B to C, and C to A. This would be > a case of "complete" but cyclic preferences. Or, > even more simple, A and B may just be completely equivalent, > so that neither is preferable to the other. In all these > cases, a "favourite" is inexistent, not just > unknown. > > > For a voter that doesn't have a sincere > > opinion it is also difficult to vote in any > > way (not just sincerely). > > Again, I talk about voters who *do* have sincere opinions > which however happen do not fall into the narrow set of > possible opinions the voting method's designer cared to > take serious. The problem is on the designer's side, not > on the voter's. One must not assume that such thiings as > "favourites" always exist or that preferences are > complete or transitive as long as one cannot prove that this > is indeed the case for all voters. And by "prove" > I don't mean "show its validity in some arbitrary > narrow-minded economic model of utility". > > One does not have all these problems when one avoids to > speak of "sincere" votes! > > Yours, Jobst > > > --- On Wed, 21/1/09, Jobst Heitzig > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > From: Jobst Heitzig <[email protected]> > > > Hi Juho! > > > > > > > What is the problem with > > > > sincerity in Plurality? > > > > > > Well, that's simple: Any voter who does not > have a > > > unique favourite option (whether that is because > of > > > indifference or uncertainty or because of cyclic > > > preferences) cannot vote "sincerely" in > Plurality! > > > > > > Yours, Jobst > > > > > > > > .... and the older mail ... > > > > > > --- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > To determine how I should vote, is that quite > complicated > > > or does it depend on what I think how others will > vote? > > > > > > Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently > easy to > > > determine from my preferences and independent of > the other > > > voters? > > > > > > If the latter is the case, the method deserves to > be called > > > "strategy-free". The whole thing has > nothing to do > > > with "sincerity". Refering to > > > "sincerity", that concept in itself > being > > > difficult to define even for methods as simple as > Plurality, > > > complicates the strategy discussion > unnecessarily. > > > > Are you looking for the English language > > meaning of sincerity or some technical > > definition of it (e.g. some voting related > > criterion)? What is the problem with > > sincerity in Plurality? > > > > Juho > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
