On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 9:02 PM, Jobst Heitzig <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear folks, > > I want to describe the most simple solution to the problem of how to > make sure option C is elected in the following situation: > > a% having true utilities A(100) > C(alpha) > B(0), > b% having true utilities B(100) > C(beta) > A(0). > > with a+b=100 and a*alpha + b*beta > max(a,b)*100. > (The latter condition means C has the largest total utility.) > > The ultimately most simple solution to this problem seems to be this method: > > > Simple Efficient Consensus (SEC): > ================================= > > 1. Each voter casts two plurality-style ballots: > A "consensus ballot" which she puts into the "consensus urn", > and a "favourite ballot" put into the "favourites urn". > > 2. If all ballots in the "consensus urn" have the same option ticked, > that option wins. > > 3. Otherwise, a ballot drawn at random from the "favourites urn" > decides.
The odds of it actually working are pretty low. For it to work, all voters must be aware that C is a valid compromise. Assuming perfect info, then it would work. However, if you change the voters to 55: A(100), C(70), B(0) 44: A(0), C(70), B(100) 1: A(0),C(30),B(100) The votes would likely be of the form 55) A favourite and C compromise 44) B favourite and C compromise 1) B favourite and B compromise In practice, there needs to be a reasonable threshold. There is always going to be a need to balance tyranny of the (N%) majority against the hold-out problem. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
