Gervase Lam wrote:
Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2009 16:05:31 +0100
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Subject: Re: [EM] Strategies for RRV/RSV and BR for multi-member
constituencies
I imagine one could make PAV variants for any of the "denominator"
methods (D'Hondt, Sainte-Lagu?, Imperiali, proportions, etc). A
Huntington-Hill variant would go like this: 1/0+ + 1/sqrt(2) + 1/sqrt(6)
+ 1/sqrt(12) + ....
See the following Election Methods posts to find something that you may
need to be wary of:
<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-February/007367.html>
<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-February/007382.html>
<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-February/007391.html>
<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-February/007429.html>
You may want to follow the complete thread using the Election Methods
archive.
Of course sequential PAV isn't PAV. I didn't know about the increased
manipulability of Webster-based methods, though, but I suppose it boils
down to whether one wants a "fair" method (like Webster/Sainte-Laguë),
or one that can resist strategy better.
To my knowledge, Warren showed that D'Hondt is the only divisor method
that doesn't have such splitting incentive. Adams works the opposite
way: parties never have an incentive to combine; and it is unique (among
divisor methods) in having this property.
Perhaps QPQ based on Webster would also have this susceptibility
problem, but my program doesn't test that, so it may give it a better
score than would "really" be warranted
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
