I have to consider the STV-CLE part further, perhaps run some
simulations. But the minimization objective has another problem, which
I'll show here.
Dan Bishop wrote:
This is true. But it doesn't mean that MMPD minimization is a bad
criterion, just that we need to consider other criteria as well. Just
like the Condorcet Criterion: It's possible for a method to comply while
being non-monotonic. That doesn't mean the Condorcet Criterion is
defective, just that we should prefer that a method should meet both
Condorcet AND Monotonicity.
It doesn't seem obvious to me that MMPD minimization is good. Consider
this scenario:
0|.A...BC..DE.|1
Three to elect. A is supported by 49% just left of him, E by 50% just
right, and D by 1% slightly closer to D than to E. Minimizing the
distance would call for electing {A, D, E}, but this gives the {D, E}
coalition disproportional power. Instead, it would be better to elect
{A, C, E}: C is slightly to the right of B (which is dead center), so
the 1% D supporters pull the last candidate somewhat away from the
center, but not enormously so.
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