http://rangevoting.org/Monotone.html
now summarizes knowledge on this - updated & corrected. Summary at end. I think the Quas-Smith theorem is rather devastating theoretically speaking - you get 100% limit probability (if large # candidates) of having nonmonotonicity existing in your election in a huge number of ways simultaneously. I mean, that's about as bad as one could imagine. [Rather annoyingly, though, neither Quas nor I have proven this for the "1D political spectrum" model. It seems clearly true since Quas's computer has produced convincing numerical evidence for it, but no proof. Proving this would be the icing on the cake.] -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
