Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be: 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr 20: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr
Juho --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Juho Laatu <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, 9 April, 2009, 7:39 PM > > --- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > > > Actually it may be a quite good strategy in > > > IRV not to rank those favourite candidates > > > that do not have a chance but to rank only > > > those candidates that have a chance. This > > > increases the probability that one's most > > > favoured candidates with chances of winning > > > the election are not eliminated too early > > > (assuming that they might win if they could > > > stay in the race until the end). > > > > That's also the strategy in Plurality - don't vote > for > > those candidates that don't have a chance. But if > everybody > > thinks like this, you end up with the "lesser of n > evils". > > Yes, it is true that if people do not rank > the lesser candidates they will never grow > and become major candidates. It may be more > important for many to try to influence the > future elections than to try to eliminate > some small risks in this election. And of > course in many cases one can vote also for > the lesser candidates without problems. The > described strategy is just a safe bet that > eliminates risks in these elections. > > (Psychological factors are an important > topic that should be covered too.) > > > One of the points of ranked voting is that you don't > have to > > do that - you can vote X > Y > Z so you say "I > like X, > > but if I can't have X, I'd have Y before Z". > > It seems that in IRV it is the safest > strategy not to rank the weak candidates > (if one only aims at winning this election > in question), but not a necessary strategy > for all situations to guarantee an optimal > vote. > > > If this ability > > is compromised by that voting for unpopular > candidates > > dilutes the vote so much one should rather not, then > why > > have ranked voting in the first place? > > Words "so much" are important. Polls are > inaccurate, people do believe in the > chances of their favourites, there will be > changes in support, there is a need to > show support to the "so far unpopular" > candidates, and the risks involved in this > strategy may be small. As a result I don't > think people should and people will apply > this strategy generally in IRV elections. > > There are however cases where the risks > are very real. The original example was > one. Here is another with moderate and > radical Democrats and Republicans. > > Approximate support: > 25: Dr>Dm>Rm>Rr > 20: Dm>Dr>Rm>Rr > 05: Dm>Rm>Dr>Rr > 05: Rm>Dm>Rr>Dr > 05: Rm>Rr>Dm>Dr > 25: Rr>Rm>Dm>Dr > > In this example all four candidates have > the risk of being eliminated early. If Dm > or Rm will be eliminated first then the > other party is likely to win. It makes > sense to the Dr and Rr supporters not to > rank their favourite first (although they > are about as popular within the party as > the other moderate candidate). > > (From this point of view Condorcet methods > allow the voters to use more sincere > rankings than IRV.) > > Juho > > > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
